Thursday, June 27, 2013
D1.18B (Oudemanhuispoort)
Authority on trade has been delegated by the European member states to the European Commission. As such it is often considered the supranational policy domain par excellence. The member states, however, still retain control over the Commission through their role in the Council of Ministers and the many consultative and coordinative meetings with the Commission. Control is required because the interests of member states and Commission often diverge. It is argued that the latter tends to be concerned with the pan-European interest, whereas the member states try to defend their own national interests. Through the application of the principal-agent model, scholars have found both arguments in favour and against Commission autonomy. While empirical evidence is convincing for both cases, the main question that remains unanswered is the scope of the different models’ validity. How autonomous is the Commission really? And how firm is the control by the member states?
In this paper, we will inquire into this topic and test the degree by which the supranational and intergovernmental model can explain trade policy outcomes. To conduct the research, we make use of a newly constructed dataset on the tariff schedules negotiated by the EU in its four most recent trade agreements. Analyses are performed at the most detailed product level.
