Varieties of Statism. Economic regulation and Economic redistribution in Southern Europe

The pioneering work by Hopkin and Blyth (2012) points out the existence of two dimensions of state economic intervention. Firstly, some OECD states tend to regulate the economy more (i.e. score higher in regulation factor scores), such as Southern European countries, while others tend to rely more on markets’ self-regulation, such as the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries. Secondly, some states tend to redistribute more (i.e. score higher in the redistribution factor scores), such as Nordic countries, while others less, such as the Anglo-Saxon or the Southern European ones. This paper aims to explore the historical factors that may explain these “varieties of statism”: why do some countries tend to systematically be interventionist in economic regulation (e.g. labor, financial and market regulation) while others are tend to systematically regulate less economic activities? And why some countries opt for more redistribution than others? We explore two historical factors. First, the role of a country’s Legal Origin (i.e. Common vs. Civil Law), underlined by many economists (e.g. La Porta et al 1997) as key for understanding path-dependencies in government intervention in the economy. Second, the role of a country’s State Origin, recently noted by political scientists (e.g. Charron et al 2012) as a factor that could explain why some countries tend to regulate the economy more.