Party Goals, the Multilevel State and Minority National Governments in Spain

This paper analyzes the bargaining relationship between statewide governing parties and regional parties in Spain’s national parliament during periods of minority government. It considers the parties’ spatial position in the two-dimensional party system, defined by the left-right and center-periphery scales, and the saliency of each issue dimension for the governing and opposition parties. Both position and salience help us understand the minority government’s alliance possibilities, its vulnerability to particular parties or sets of parties, and its ability to shift allies, i.e. change the party composition of alliances.

It argues that the relative ability of the government to engage in alliance shifting in parliament indeed strengthens or weakens its bargaining position vis-à-vis regional parties. However, the government’s ability to do so is not exclusively based on its spatial position in the party system. Other factors, such as a climate of economic crisis or the perceived acceptability of potential allies, conditioned the use of this strategy. The government’s ability to shift allies also depended on the disposition of potential regional party allies, which is not only impacted by their policy positions but also by their governing status at the regional level. Additionally, the importance the parties place on each issue dimension makes collaboration more or less difficult, thus influencing the ease with which vote trading can occur. The relative salience of the distinct dimensions of party competition, in general, facilitates vote trading between regional and statewide parties, independent of the governing party’s ability to shift allies.