Can parties represent after communism? The dissipation of the regime divide cleavage in post-Communist party systems

The fall of Communism in East and Central Europe, found parliaments in the region at different levels of independence from the executive and at different levels of institutionalization. We argue that legislative organization—the degree to which the executive controls the legislative process is one of the key variables determining the pace at which programmatic parties and party systems emerge. Specifically, in some countries, the post-communist versus post-dissident divide persists as the main cleavage defining post-authoritarian party systems, even years after the transition. However, in others, it has transformed into substantive cleavages that are not directly associated with authoritarian legacies. We theorize that in countries where the opposition faced weak legislative institutions, it could organize for elections by simply presenting itself as an untarnished alternative to successor autocrats, whereas in countries with strong legislative institutions, electoral success required party organization and thus facilitated a more speedy development of party programs going beyond an anti-communist agenda. We present empirical support for our theory drawing on several post-communist legislatures, focusing our narrative on the specific example of Poland.  There, we argue, the strengthening of the agenda power in parliament created a majoritarian dynamic that eventually contributed indirectly to the emergence of strong programmatic parties.