Saturday, March 15, 2014
Sales Conference (Omni Shoreham)
A number of authors have argued that the EU’s crisis response measures, as well as the changes in EU governance that have occurred in the wake of the crisis, have weakened European democracy. At the EU level, we have seen the growing importance of emergency summits not preceded by broader political debate, and the EU institutions that have gained powers are the ones that are weakest in electoral accountability. At the member-state level, the scope for autonomous decision-making on European issues has shrunk, as compromises hammered out in Brussels are presented to national publics as done deals to be rubber-stamped by national parliaments. The crisis has, in other words, resulted in a reduced supply of participation opportunities for an active citizenry. On the other hand, as Andrew Moravcsik has pointed out more than a decade ago, such a supply-based argument is only fully convincing if there is indeed a popular demand for political participation in EU-related decisions. Does such a demand exist? Has it grown as a consequence of the crisis? To answer these questions, this paper examines two rounds of focus groups with average European citizens – held in December 2010 and in December 2013 in Germany, Austria, Spain and Ireland – which give insights into the ways in which European integration is (or is not) politicized in the EU population. This allows for an assessment of whether there is a mismatch between democratic supply and demand, and whether it has grown as a result of the crisis.
