Explaining Social Pacts: Weak Government or Strong Executive? Rethinking the Irish and Italian Case in the Aftermath of the Crisis

A prominent strategy of adjustment to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe was the negotiation of social pacts between governments and trade unions. These were seen as a mechanism to mobilize broad support for weak governments to introduce difficult reforms. But in the context of the Eurozone crisis, governments in Europe have never been weaker, yet we are not witnessing the negotiation of social pacts to enhance competitiveness. Why? Drawing on the two cases that defined the literature - Ireland and Italy - I argue that the causal mechanism that made social pacting possible was not a weak government per se but a strong executive vis-à-vis the parliament. Concretely, it was the authority, support and intervention of the Prime Minister’s Office that provided the causal mechanism that led weak governments in Ireland and southern Europe to negotiate social pacts. In the aftermath of the crisis Prime Ministers have eschewed this role. Pluralism is in, concertation is out.