Friday, March 14, 2014
Sales Conference (Omni Shoreham)
European Integration is increasingly shaped by a ‘constraining dissensus’. We explain theoretically and show empirically that the consequence is not necessarily to slow down integration dynamic but to change its shape. The theoretical explanation extends the conventional Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) framework in three ways. First, we assume that national preferences reflect not only sectorial interests but also mass attitudes. Sectorial interests and mass attitude can be consistent (both either supporting or opposing integration) or inconsistent (one supporting, the other opposing integration). Second, we assume that intergovernmental bargaining among the member states concerns not only the substance but also the specificity of the bargain (high or low). As we argue, governments may prefer unspecific agreements to cope with inconsistent sectorial and mass political demands at home. Finally, we assume the extent of delegation to supranational actors to vary not only with the requirements of credible commitment to the intergovernmental bargain but also with the need to manage inconsistent political demands at home.
In the paper, we develop the model, derive the conjectures and conduct a plausibility probe with four mini case studies. Our four cases are arms procurement (publics and sectorial interests in favor), military capacity building (publics in favor, sectorial interest opposed), the creation of the EFSF/ESM (publics against, sectorial interests in favor) and the reform of the European financial supervision system (publics against, sectorial interests critical). Each case looks at domestic politics, preferences and bargaining positions of Germany, France and the UK.
