Safeguarding Democracy? Pre-democratic Elites and the Role of Institutional Safeguards

This paper develops a framework for understanding the role of elite safeguards in the process of democratization. Elite safeguards; that is institutional mechanisms for the protection of pre-democratic elites, have been a central feature of democratic development in early democratizers. Both temporary and permanent safeguards have historically been used to achieve "buy-in" to the democratic process and reassure reluctant elites about their future in the democratic regime. However contemporary democratization theory has failed to adequately theorize this. Thus similar safeguards today are taken as signs of authoritarian backsliding, endangering the democratic regime. Drawing on the experience of historical democratizers, I develop a framework for distinguishing between "productive safeguards", those which leave open arenas for future contestation, and "regressive safeguards", which close off arenas of competition and hinder future efforts at democratic contestation. While the latter is clearly detrimental to democratization, the former I argue may in fact be critical to the success of a democracy. I apply this framework in the context of the Arab Spring to illustrate the analytical use of a more nuanced view of elite safeguards.