A steering, but ineffective and counterproductive force? The role of the EEC Commission in the development of European banking regulation and supervision in the long 1970s

Friday, March 14, 2014
Senate (Omni Shoreham)
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol , School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow
This paper looks at the role of the Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the discussions about the creation of a "banking union" from the late 1960s until the early 1980s. This research is based on a range of primary sources drawn not only from the archives of the EEC Commission, but also from private commercial banks, the British Bankers Association, and various European governments. It first looks at when, why and how the EEC debates about European banking regulation and supervision emerged. These discussions began around 1965-1966, when the European Commission first aired such projects and the Segré report on the integration of capital markets in the EEC was released. The ambitions were initially far-reaching (the original goal was the EEC-wide harmonisation of banking regulation), but the results were very tiny (creation of a new committee, three limited directives in 1973, 1977 and 1983). Then it scrutinises why and how the Commission changed its strategy, and abandoned the ambition of an all-encompassing harmonisation to prioritise a more modest step-by-step approach. Finally it elaborates on the tension between regional and global dynamics at play, as well as the growing hiatus between European monetary cooperation and European banking regulation and supervision. This considerably limited the EEC Commission’s room of manoeuver, and contributes to explain its very limited achievements. Taken together, the three parts of this paper offer interesting insights into the current discussions about the creation of a European banking union, by shedding light on its often neglected origins.