Taxation of the Rich and the Origins of Constitutionalism

Central to different literatures is the assumption that the granting of representation and other elements of democratization have fiscal origins.  Bargaining over broad-based taxation is supposed to generate political effects at the level of rights and institutions.  Starting from research that has re-evaluated the historical origins of this hypothesis (medieval representation in England and France), I formulate an alternative one that is based on the obligatory character of representation.  Accordingly, a key criterion for the emergence of representation was state capacity to compel the most powerful, politically and economically, actors.  Representative institutions consolidated when such actors had the incentives to regularize fiscal negotiations with the ruler and this only happened when they were compelled to contribute.

The aim in this paper is to test the observable implications of this hypothesis on modern cases, so as to extend its external validity.  Careful selection of cases for controlled comparison will aim to determine whether taxation of powerful economic groups was present before the emergence of representative institutions.  Cross-national data do not exist for the periods and regions in question, so  I will examine whether correlation can be established between taxation of the powerful and the emergence of representative government in the European nineteenth century, with low scores of this variable associated with limited capacity in this dimension.  I will also examine cases afflicted with the “resource curse” to relate degrees of institutionalization with extent of taxation.