The limited electoral consequences of labor market dualization: the electoral effects of the Agenda 2010 on labor market insiders and outsiders

This paper addresses the electoral consequences of the German Agenda 2010. Being one of the most profound projects to reform the labor market and the welfare state in the last decade and following Pierson’s “new politics of the welfare state”-hypothesis, the Agenda 2010 is usually perceived to have translated into an electoral disaster for the SPD. In this article, we focus on the electoral behavior of labor market groups directly affected by the Agenda 2010 in four elections from 1998 to 2009. Analyzing the electoral behavior of those directly affected by the Agenda 2010 has been difficult so far for the ambivalent effect of the Agenda on different labor market groups and the lack of suitable data on the micro-level. For example, it is still unclear whether the Agenda 2010 re-enforced labor market dualization or reduced the privileges of insiders while enhancing activation for outsiders. We address the first issue by identifying four groups of Agenda 2010-losers: three outsider-groups (unemployed, elderly unemployed and low-skilled employed) and one insider-group (industrial workers). We evade the second issue by employing a meso-level data set with detailed information on the regional socio-economic situation and the official electoral outcome. First results indicate that the effects of the Agenda 2010 on the electoral behavior of the Agenda loser groups were limited, while the subsequent pension reform had more serious consequences.