Preference Voting and Descriptive Representation in the German Cities

Theories of descriptive representation suggest that having members of one's own group as representatives in assemblies, legislatures and parliaments provide a number of benefits. As the share of European electorates with migration background increases, it is often assumed that the descriptive representation of immigrant minorities will (and should) increase as well. Is this actually happening? Cross-national comparison is often difficult, but there appears to be a general trend toward more immigrants in legislatures. However, the actual levels of descriptive representation achieved often seem to have little to do with the actual increases in migrant-background populations, vary widely across countries,  and may be conditioned more by electoral and administrative institutions.

This paper starts with a broad survey of the numbers of (first-, second-, and later-generation) immigrants in Western European legislatures, and then focuses on the German case. By integrating German 2011 census data with previously collected data on migrant candidates, the patterns and mechanisms of descriptive representation can be more closely examined. When we look at variations across electoral rules, we see that a much greater share of the variation in how many immigrant candidates get elected has to do with these institutional factors than with demography or background structural factors. Furthermore, when we try to find the source of who actually casts their votes for immigrant-background candidates, we find more complex processes than simple co-ethnic voting.