Minority Government and Office Concessions in a Multi-Level State: Lessons from Spain

This paper examines the performance of minority parliamentary governments in Spain. In particular, it examines how the multilevel exchange of political office between statewide and regional parties at their priority level of governance, the national and regional, respectively, bolsters minority governments’ governing capacity. Most research on minority governments focuses on the policy goals of parties that opt to stay out of government and therefore policy concessions. Office concessions are under-investigated in the minority government literature. A multilevel state creates the potential for an additional type of office concession: subnational office, including cabinet portfolios. In Spain, subnational office concessions are not formalized in an official appointment made by the national government but rather through the national governing party’s regional branch providing political support or attenuating its opposition to a regional government. The multilevel exchange of office eases the reconciliation of the parties’ goals and thereby fosters governing capacity. The paper demonstrates the high level of vertical party discipline within the parties’ territorial organizations, which is necessary to secure the multilevel agreements. It also documents the exchange of office security and governability across state levels, and explores whether office-based concessions to regional parties provide additional assurance of governing capacity for national minority governments.