Portugal was bailed out in 2011 and was put under ‘hard’ conditionality. The Portuguese Economic Adjustment Programme made an explicit mention about the need to cut pension’s expenditure. On the other hand, Spain has experienced ‘mild’ conditionality through the bailout of the banks and Italy has experienced ‘soft’ conditionality. However, references about the need to reform the pension system have been common in the European Commission recommendations for both countries. Trade unions have reacted differently vis-à-vis the pensions’ reforms. In Portugal, they have strongly mobilized against the reforms. In Spain, they first mobilized against the PSOE reform but they ended up signing a trilateral agreement. Later, they also opposed the PP reforms but the mobilization was weaker. In Italy, trade unions responded with feeble resistance to the reforms.
The objective of this paper is to observe the links between the EU constraints and the trade unions’ reactions. Were trade unions aware of the EU pressures to reform the pension system? Did those pressures have an impact on their strategies? This paper attempts to answer to those questions by observing the processes of political exchange between governments, trade unions and the EU. In so doing, the causal mechanisms explaining unions’ behavior vis-à-vis EU constraints will be pointed out.
