Autocracy Enhancing Multilateralism in the EU?

International institutions in general, and the European Union in particular, have been described as devices for safeguarding, strengthening, or “locking in” (Müller 2012) the liberal democratic institutions of member states (Simmons 2008; Keohane, Macedo & Moravcsik 2009; Sedelmeier 2014). This paper argues that while these are very worthy aspirations for the EU to have, and are enshrined in Art 2 TEU, recent impairments of democratic and constitutional rule in several member states have thrown into question the EU’s ability to live up to the promise of safeguarding domestic liberal democracy. The paper contends that the EU’s existing institutional structure is not only inadequate to this task, but in important respects works to impede it. First, the credibility lent by the coveted status of EU member state may embolden, rather than discourage, the anti-democratic impulses of governments. Second, EU membership might afford a safe and stable space in which to experiment with authoritarian rule. Third, the functionally delimited scope of the EU’s authority generates an expectation on the part of member states that supranational authority is confined to creating quantifiable public goods such as economic prosperity and consumer protection. The dearth of credible and useable institutional mechanisms for realizing the lofty commitments of Art 2 strengthens the perception that the EU’s authority is limited to the functional domain. Lastly, the constitutionally questionable measures taken in response to the euro crisis suggest that the EU itself treats democratic principles as dispensable in the face of existential threats to its core objectives.