Territorial Autonomy and State Capacity: Explaining Separatist Conflict Diffusion

Previous research on the strategic interaction between governments and self-determination movements assumes that ethnic groups are more likely to (violently) seek self-determination if they have observed territorial accommodation towards an earlier challenge. In such scenarios, governments are considered homogenous and rigid over time. Similarly, separatist ethnic groups are also considered homogenous actors which are outside and in opposition to the government. Relying on new data on approximately 300 Eurasian self-determination movements and their interaction with the government since 1945, this paper contests both assumptions. I argue that an ethnic group’s perception of a government and hence the likelihood of separatist conflict diffusion is clustered for different government characteristics and constellations that can vary over time. These reputation- and capacity-building characteristics include the political system, the government’s ethnic composition and inclusiveness, its ‘demographic size’ and whether it has previously been involved in conflict. Potential self-determination challengers draw inference about the government based on such characteristics and I test how differences in the latter could change the effects of government action on separatist conflict diffusion. This paper then examines the other form of power-sharing, namely governmental power-sharing, and challenges the hitherto undisputed assumption of an impermeable government-separatist dyad where self-determination movements are considered as actors outside and in opposition to the government. I examine the effect of governmental power-sharing on the groups’ likelihood of challenging the state and investigate how it can be used as a method for governments to build not only reputation but also capacity.