In historical ‘coming together federations’ (Stepan), the (often partial) centralization of core state powers was a key factor in the territorial, institutional and ideational consolidation of the federal state. The European integration of core state powers has the opposite effect. It is associated with the territorial, institutional, and ideational fragmentation of the EU. In a strange sense therefore more integration of core state powers leads to less federation in the EU.
Market integration is usually portrayed as a problem-solving exercise by the main theories of integration. The European integration of core state powers differs from this portrait. First, it is unclear whether it actually solves domestic problems or rather increases them. Second, it is not clear that the demand for the integration powers comes only or even mainly from private economic interest groups. Third, supranational actors figure not so much as ‘engines of integration’ nor as commitment devices but as garbage trucks of integration that have to dispose of problems the member states can’t solve among themselves, and take on more tasks in the process than is in their own institutional interest.
