of capitalism) would expect to restrict entry to foreign investors since these entrants would undermine their insider model of corporate governance and long-standing relationships between firms and banks and the state.
However, we observe that both countries have been fairly open to SWFs. While new legislation has been introduced, it was not targeted at SWFs specifically, and was rarely – if ever – used. However, the role of the state, the debates and the extent of hostility varied. Building on the new statist literature, we explore why openness has occurred as well as cross-national differences by examining the concentration and location of power within the State. Specifically, we study the powers and preferences of legislatures and executives, examining their interests, abilities to ‘frame’ the issue of SWF investment and capacities to maintain SWF investments as part of ‘quiet politics’. We show that in both countries the State has actively sought SWF investments, suggesting that state activism does not necessarily lead to less economic openness. Our general argument therefore questions assumptions about how coordinated and ‘statist’ polities respond to outside investment when made by foreign states.
