Banking Union and the Reform of the Financial Supervisory System: An Effective Resolution for the Eurozone Crisis

Thursday, July 9, 2015
S13 (13 rue de l'Université)
Hideki Sato , Faculty of Economics and Management, Kanazawa University
This paper aims to examine the Banking Union proposed and improved from 2012 until now, as an effective resolution for recent Eurozone debt crisis, and to analyze the reform of Europe’s financial supervisory system.

   First, it investigates structural problems within the European Economic and Monetary Union. Particularly, it places the Franco-German relationship at the center, and tries to relate the historical viewpoint on monetary union to the current situation.

   Second, it analyzes the ideals and concrete proposals for the Banking Union submitted by European Commission in terms of comparative feasibility.

   Third, it considers solutions for the Eurozone’s current financial and sovereign debt crisis from a comprehensive view including financial supervision.

   To summarize this paper, I present the following four points.

(1) Not only ‘preemptive’ views but also ‘ex-post’ views are needed in micro- and macro-prudential policies to deal with emergent crises.

(2) The Banking Union is a breakthrough project. In the future, the European response to the crisis could serve as a global standard in resolution and financial regulation.

(3) We could think that central banks would play a more significant role not only for price and financial stability, but also play a central role as a supervisory institution.

(4) Banking Union proposal has relatively high feasibility in comparison to fiscal union. To complement the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy, member states’ fiscal coordination and structural policies, the Banking Union is essential to make a genuine EMU, as part of not just the common concrete vision but also its implementation.

Paper
  • Banking Union and Reform of the Financial Supervisory System (Hideki Sato).pdf (402.0 kB)