Up to 2008, many central bank statutes reflected the experience of the so-called Great Moderation – a period not only of benign macroeconomic conditions but also of unprecedented consensus regarding the institutional position of the central bank and the purpose of monetary policy. This was particularly true of the European Central Bank, whose narrow price-stability mandate reinforced the idea of an ‘independent’ central bank, which in turn facilitated the political process of aligning various sectoral and national interests behind the idea of monetary union. The combination of narrow mandates and strict independence also prevailed in other countries, such as the UK, which had adopted inflation targeting regimes during the 1990s. Since 2008, however, the scope of monetary policy has radically increased as central banks everywhere have backstopped banking systems on a grand scale, multiplied their balance sheets, implicitly or explicitly embraced growth or employment targets, and assumed supervisory and regulatory responsibilities. Today, the transformation of central banking is an open-ended process, uncertainty over which is augmented by the re-politicization of this previously muted dimension of state agency. The contributions to this panel take stock of the changes that have occurred and examine their implications for the future political economy of monetary and financial governance. They share a common interest in the compatibility of central banks’ macroeconomic and financial stability responsibilities, the debate about independence versus fiscal-monetary coordination, and future challenges to the accountability and legitimacy of newly empowered central banks.