The Structural Basis of Democratic Pacts: Parliamentarism and Agrarian Capitalism in Early Modern England

Contrary to the claims of transitions theory, the fate of a pacted democracy does not necessarily hinge on the design of its pact.  Rather, the structure of its political economy is key.  When elites have economic interests that are compatible with democracy, a democratizing pact will likely survive;  otherwise, it likely will not.  In making this argument, I draw on structuralist criticisms of transitions theory, but I depart from the conventional wisdom about which structural variables matter most for democratization.  I focus not on the level of development, or the distribution of wealth, but instead on the economic autonomy of elites.  I develop this argument through an analysis of Barry Weingast’s interpretation of the Glorious Revolution, and I test it by examining choices for alignment among landed elites at the outbreak of the English Civil War.