The Electoral Effects of General Strikes in Western Europe

Trade unions in Europe have witnessed persistent decline in their bargaining and political power since the 1970s.  Despite this, unions have proven politically resilient in resorting to new means of political influence, namely the general strike.  General strikes against unpopular policy reforms have occurred with increasing frequency across Western Europe since 1980, intensifying considerably during the European debt crisis. Unlike social pacts, general strikes serve the important function of blame attribution for welfare reform, as they publically assign the responsibility of retrenchment policies to incumbents. These strikes, in conjunction with governments’ willingness to offer concessions in their wake, raise the question as to whether they have electoral consequences. We analyze how the interaction between general strikes and social spending retrenchment, as well as the interaction between social pacts and social spending retrenchment, influence electoral outcomes for governments for 16 West European countries (EU15 plus Norway) from 1980-2012. We find that electoral losses for incumbents engaging in welfare retrenchment are magnified by a general strike during the electoral cycle, but are mitigated if a social pact is concluded.  Welfare retrenchment in the absence of strikes or pacts, on the other hand, produces no significant electoral consequences. Our results suggest that, despite membership decline, unions continue to carry important political influence turning public opinion against governments and their policies via strike action