Saturday, April 16, 2016
Symphony Ballroom (DoubleTree by Hilton Philadelphia Center City)
In the Eurozone Crisis, ‘bad ideas’ were initially resilient not just in the discourse but also in practice, as neoliberal ideas focused on austerity and structural reform were embedded in the legislative packages and intergovernmental pacts (Six Pack, Two Pack, and Fiscal Compact). Later, however, the bad ideas continued to be resilient in the discourse while the practices incrementally changed for the better as rival ideas gain influence. This paper explains why such discursive resilience occurred through an empirical examination of EU political actors’ discourse; first in their initial response to the crisis that reinforced the ‘stability’ rules, and then in their shift to a discourse of growth and flexibility, all the while insisting that they were sticking by the rules. The paper argues, in essence, that leaders chose to reinterpret the rules ‘by stealth,’ that is, by not admitting to their national constituencies – or even to one another – that their ideas were not working, and that the rules therefore needed to change. Theoretically, the paper explains this according to five possible reasons for the resilience of neo-liberal ideas: the adaptability of the concepts, their lack of actual implementation, their strength in the discourse compared to alternatives, the role of interests in benefiting from those ideas, and their embedding in institutions.