Crisis, Sovereignty, and Governance in the European Union: Comparing the Eurozone Crisis and the Migration Crisis

Friday, April 15, 2016
Rhapsody (DoubleTree by Hilton Philadelphia Center City)
Meghan Moquin Luhman , Political Science, Johns Hopkins University
Nicolas Jabko , Johns Hopkins University
Why do states often invoke sovereignty when pressing for more governance at the EU level? Faced with a Eurozone crisis and then a migration crisis, many EU governments have pushed for reforms that would enhance EU governance without encroaching on their sovereignty. Furthermore, EU institutions have taken these claims seriously, incorporating ideas about national discretion into recent reforms of EU governance.  In order to resolve this puzzle, we argue that “EU governance” was a repertoire that tied together different national concerns with sovereignty. Drawing on constructivist and pragmatist understandings of ideas and institutions, we argue that crises represent opportunities for ideational repertoires of EU governance and national sovereignty to be re-combined in new ways. The Eurozone crisis led to the introduction of new rules and of a European Stability Mechanism; yet Eurozone states still enjoy considerable flexibility under the new regime. The migration crisis led to the adoption of a quota system for redistributing refugees; yet member states are still granted discretion in the temporary reintroduction of border controls and suspension of participation in the quota system. These solutions have been criticized as weak and belated responses, but they offer crucial insights into how policymakers respond to crisis. Instead of classic interstate bargaining amongst hard-wired national interests, we observe dynamic and open policymaking processes in which ad-hoc coalitions actively construct the terms of policy change. Far from sharply constraining or derailing EU policy-making, national concerns with sovereignty have provided the raw materials for the recombination and repackaging of EU governance.