The Eurozone Crisis and the Refugee Crisis Compared: Risk Sharing, Distributive Conflict and the Integration of Core State Powers

In this joint paper with Philipp Genschel, we compare differences and similarities in the management of the Eurozone crisis and the recent refugee crisis. While the Eurozone crisis is well-researched, the still unfolding refugee crisis is not. The comparison highlights not only the specific features of this crisis but also elucidates general problems of risk sharing and distributive conflict associated with the European integration of core state powers.

The first part of the paper is descriptive. We identify and compare the key players, the main lines of conflict and the bargaining dynamics and outcomes across both crises. What were the main issues? What was the intergovernmental constellation of national interests? How did supranational institutions shape or reshape this constellation? How were conflicts framed, negotiated, solved or postponed? While the answers for the Eurozone crisis can be gleaned from the extant literature, the answers for the refugee crisis will be provided on the basis of original research. The second part of the paper is explanatory. We explore the potential of economic approaches to risk sharing in fiscal federations and monetary unions to elucidate the patterns of distributive conflict and the menu of choices structuring the Eurozone as well as the refugee crises. And we explore the potential of two political variables highlighted in recent political science theories of integration, to explain the framing, the process and the outcome of collective choice making during the crises: mass publics and state elites.