Is It Trade Unions or Left Partisanship That Moderate Top Executive Compensation? Varieties of Weak Moderation on Salary, Bonus and Equity Based Pay Across Capitalist Markets

Due to growth strategies, left parties generate weak moderation on managerial pay.  Effects are incremental for trade unions as well, albeit stronger than left parties. Weak moderation differs across similar markets depending on varieties of corporate governance liberalization stres post 2003 Shareholder Act. Strong liberalization weakens moderation, hence higher pay levels. Multilevel OLS regression of 13 OECD countries shows a robust significant negative β for trade unions -2.7,-4.5 % and left -.1 %. Left’s weak positive significant robust effect on equity suggests a growth strategy impact. Moreover, H₀of no between country effects of unions and left is rejected. Robust base model estimation shows that 30.5, 41 and 7.4 % of the unexplained variance in log real salary, bonus and equity is due to between country differences, hence, between country effects matter less for equity pay. The random slope models reveal weak moderation in high corporate governance liberalization cases (UK, US, France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland), and stronger moderation for middle (Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands) and lower cases (Sweden, Denmark, Norway).  Among others, random slope estimation shows that Germany stands out among high liberalization cases with lower aggregate pay. Finland distinguishes itself with high pay among Nordic countries ensuring less effective moderation of corporatist institutions and left legacy.