“Left with Nothing” or Ready for Work? Conditional Activation As Income Support

In this paper we ask how similar the conditionality element is in activation programmes cross nationally, examining in depth a set of four cases representative of different types of welfare state regimes. Conditionality is defined as the sanctioning of the unemployed by cutting or deferring benefits in case of non-compliance to the activation rules when they fail to follow specified action. We argue that despite differences in emphasis and implementation, these programmes display an affinity with reformulated neoliberal market based ideas. We compare the (re)introduction of conditionality of labor market policies in a sample of countries (the UK, Germany, France and Italy) to determine whether there is a common dynamic driving this policy development producing similar programmes or whether there are distinct trajectories rooted in varying historical-policy configurations. From a detailed examination of workfare schemes, we argue that the general activation turn (Bonoli2013, Rueda 2015) observable since the late 1990s has a dark side: unemployment benefits have (again) become more conditional on proving deservingness. Often dressed up as unemployed-centred, in fact conditionality always means coercion; and the outputs are commonly disappointing measured in terms of securing permanent properly paying jobs. This characterization applies cross nationally and harks back to a nineteenth century liberal ideology about the essential idleness of the unemployed. But we find that conditionality really kicks in through cross national variations in sanction enforcement, a variation we explain in the paper.