Thursday, April 14, 2016
Assembly B (DoubleTree by Hilton Philadelphia Center City)
This paper introduces a theory of party group switching in the European Parliament (EP) that is both multi-dimensional and multi-level. By including the Members’ of European Parliament (MEPs) ideal points on the pro-/anti-integration scale, I build on McElroy and Benoit’s (2010) one-dimensional, ideological spatial model. This addition makes it possible to explain the critical case of the UK Conservative’s defection from the European People’s Party (EPP). The Tories did not only become more ideologically extreme; rather, over time they also became adamantly opposed to European integration. The current theory accounts for such a multi-dimensional shift. Further, I introduce a system-level variable—party system institutionalization—to a discussion based largely on individual-level variables such as policy-, office-, or vote-seeking behavior. I contend that the three ideologically moderate groups act as a cartel which regularly votes as a pro-integration bloc. The non-cartel groups have no opportunity to meaningfully oppose legislation; thus, a two-tiered, non-competitive system emerges. The minor party groups are actively underinstitutionalized while the cartel remains dominant and overinstitutionalized. This paper applies to the EP the theory introduced by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) in their discussion of party systems in Latin America. The hypothesis states that most switches should occur among the inchoate, non-cartel groups, a few switchers should leave the minor party groups to join the cartel, and groups in the cartel should witness very few defections. This theory, therefore, makes it possible to predict the direction and intensity of switches—two characteristics thus far unexamined in the literature.
