Schengen Under Pressure? Instrumentalisation of Freedom of Movement in the Council of Ministers

The Schengen agreement has been portrayed as one of the main achievements of European integration, embracing all the core areas, common market, free movement of people, capital and goods and citizenship. Nevertheless, it has remained controversial: in some states, the topic of migration, borders and security has been instrumentalized by national governments in an attempt at responding to pressure by populist and extremist parties. 

This case study on the post-Lisbon EU investigates the strategic use of the Schengen Agreement and the concept of free movement by national actors, and evaluates strategies of influencing EU decision-making. I investigate the case of the “Schengen Governance Package” (2011-2013), an example of how national opposition to Schengen arises and to what extent it interferes with the acquis. 

Preliminary results show that, in the Council, strategies using populist pressure (France, Italy) are unsuccessful, if there is no supporting coalition by other influential states (Germany, Benelux). This relates to divergences in pressure by populism as well as preferences regarding sovereignty in matters of borders and free movement. Alternative non-coalition based strategies are equally unsuccessful. Between institutions, we observe an increasing battle of competences, with the European Parliament challenging both Commission and Council. Interestingly, both within and between institutions, the most common settlement strategy is resorting to informal restricted groups; conflict resolution is not political or financial (ex. side payments) but textual: adopting a general wording and leaving as much discretion as possible to states for implementation.