The EU’s Influence over the International Criminal Court Project: How Far Can the Dual Strategy of Normative Entrenchment and Policy Adjustment Go?

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is considered by many as a breakthrough in the evolution of international criminal law. The first part of this paper argues that the creation of the ICC in 1998 – and reaffirmation during the 2010 Kampala Review Conference – came down to the presence of a ‘quasi’ hegemonic structure where power, institutions and ideas were sufficiently aligned with each other to withstand the challenges from a minority of key states motivated by protectionist agendas. The EU and its Member States played a crucial role in creating the right environment for this ‘quasi’ hegemonic structure. Their success was based on a flexible disposition that alternated between normative entrenchment on the ICC ideals and policy accommodation to win over reluctant countries. On the other hand, the second part of the paper questions the resilience of this dual strategy of normative entrenchment and policy adjustment when faced with shifting power dynamics that are arguably already calling into question the legitimacy and day to day running of the ICC. The paper will focus primarily on the example of the increasingly conflicting ICC-African Union relations where the EU exhibits normative entrenchment over non-cooperation over certain arrest warrants while simultaneously exhibiting the capacity for policy accommodation towards the US, arguably to safeguard the latter’s rapprochement to the ICC project.