Cleavage Structure, Limited Redistribution and Concentration of Power: When and How Do Ascriptive Identities Shape Developed Welfare States?

How do social cleavages involving ascriptive identities---ethnicity, religion, language and race---shape welfare policies in developed democracies? The current literature suggests that higher diversity has a linear, negative effect on redistribution levels. However, the empirical evidence is inconclusive and equally-divided countries vary in their welfare policies. My paper addresses this puzzle by proposing a conditional relationship instead. I argue that ascriptive identity cleavages should have a negative effect on welfare policy only insofar as they overlap with class, such that redistribution occurs between groups. I also contend that this negative effect should be differential and focused primarily on class-related programs and on limited access, whereas policies benefiting all groups similarly should remain unaffected. Finally, I maintain that this relationship should be stronger when political power is more concentrated and intergroup checks on policymaking are weaker. I find empirical support in my hypotheses using quantitative data from 23 developed democracies in the years 1980-2011. My paper thus sheds light on the structural conditions under which ascriptive identity divisions affect modern welfare states.