ECB Power in Banking Union: Independent or Constrained? Analysing Agenda-Setting and Decision-Making in the Integration Process of the ECB As the European Supervisory Authority.

The creation of Banking Union in June 2012 represents one of the most important steps towards European integration to date. After all the resistance of the member states to centralized banking supervision and regulation, integration continues. However, the integration outcome is not in line with what it is functionally desirable because Banking Union is a hybrid construction with supranational and intergovernmental elements. There is not empowerment of the Commission, but of the ECB which also showed its own will to protect the Euro which was contested by some member states. Following this integration paradox, the research question is: “How can the ECB integration process in Banking Union be explained?” The main underlying question is “Which factors explain the agenda-setting and decision-making process regarding the integration of the ECB in Banking Union?” To answer the research question, a case study research is conducted and explaining-outcome process-tracing is adopted to find the causal mechanisms linking actors’ attitudes and preferences towards the centralization of banking regulation and supervision at EU level with the outcome of the negotiations. Rational choice can explain why and how collective decision-making occurs, and the nature of distributional problems. Data will mostly consist of EU policy documents on banking union and expert interviews, among other sources. Empirically, this project will analyse processes of EU agenda-setting, Council decision-making, and inter-institutional dynamics in this policy field. Theoretically, this research will contribute to the theoretical debates on European integration theories and aims at crafting a theoretical explanation for this integration outcome.