Saturday, April 16, 2016
Concerto B (DoubleTree by Hilton Philadelphia Center City)
This paper examines the European Commission’s role in reshaping the financial market reform agenda after the 2008 crisis. It first details the material and political threats the crisis posed for an integrated financial market with EU at its heart. It then explores how the cleavages and fragmentation in the regulatory responses ended up breeding further EU institutionalization and standardization, as Europe initially headed towards a coordinated regulatory regime rather than a centralized one.
It tracks the ECs actions in shaping coalitions and reform proposals at the EU level, based on a careful triangulation of interviews and archival data. The research suggest that the EC has been central in drawing together a patchwork of member states and interest groups lacking a coherent orientation, by reframing the crisis and the reform project itself. By gradually deemphasizing cross border financial market instability, a policy dilemma marred contradicting interests, and reframing banking reforms in terms of the monetary, fiscal and economic ails, the EC succeeded in reimagined the reform agenda to one where further EU integration could be a unifying solution. The paper ends by discussing the contribution to the ideational literature, and it reflects on the policy implications of neglecting lessons from the crisis that were incompatible with the integrative project.
It tracks the ECs actions in shaping coalitions and reform proposals at the EU level, based on a careful triangulation of interviews and archival data. The research suggest that the EC has been central in drawing together a patchwork of member states and interest groups lacking a coherent orientation, by reframing the crisis and the reform project itself. By gradually deemphasizing cross border financial market instability, a policy dilemma marred contradicting interests, and reframing banking reforms in terms of the monetary, fiscal and economic ails, the EC succeeded in reimagined the reform agenda to one where further EU integration could be a unifying solution. The paper ends by discussing the contribution to the ideational literature, and it reflects on the policy implications of neglecting lessons from the crisis that were incompatible with the integrative project.
