Illiberal Democracy and Lawyers in Chief

In a constitutional democracy, the wishes of temporary democratic publics are legitimately constrained by constitutional values that generate liberal legal limits to democratic processes.  Illiberal democracy is constitutional democracy’s evil twin.  In an illiberal democracy, the freedom of democratic publics is also limited by law – but the law in question is shaped by illiberal rather than liberal values.  In an illiberal democracy, the ability of democratic publics to change their government is constrained because of the need for political solidarity and liberal rights can be sacrificed in the name of collective goals. But it is important to note that illiberal democracy is crucially legal and can be effective precisely because it mirrors constitutional democracy by setting up legal limits to democratic processes.  In short, illiberal democracy relies on the faith that democratic publics have in legality itself.   In this paper, I explore two cases of illiberal democracy – Hungary and Russia.   In both cases, the chief executive is a lawyer whose legalistic approach to power crucially shapes the form that illiberal democracy takes.