Thursday, July 13, 2017
JWS - Room J7 (J361) (University of Glasgow)
What explains the variation across Central and Eastern European countries’ “control of corruption” efforts since acceding to the European Union? Initially, I offer several statistical models suggesting governments in EU-applicant CEE are in general prone to corruption, which implies that they need to be pressured to fight corruption. Thus, successful efforts to tackle corruption in CEE are predicted mostly when there is high pressure on national governments, which would otherwise engage in corrupt practices. Moreover, significant negative changes in corruption control are likely to emerge soon after such pressure weakens, which is observed in most CEE countries after accession. Yet, very few of the EU members in post-communist Europe have avoided backsliding in the aftermath of accession, which can be explained by the best practices mechanism. In these countries, the domestic motivation to deliver reforms emerges long before EU pressure becomes visible. Ultimately, significant progress is recorded soon after the political elite begins to receive external assistance from international institutions. Therefore, even after the EU’s political pressure fades away (in the post-accession period), these countries continue to use their expertise (transferred from the EU during negotiations) for sustained control of corruption. In-depth analyses tracing anti-corruption reforms in Estonia and Romania since the 1990s highlight how the best practices and pressure mechanisms work in practice.
