Friday, July 14, 2017
Turnbull Room (University of Glasgow)
During the past two decades Poland joined Hungary, and a number of other European countries such as Italy or Spain, have experienced prolonged demographic emergencies. The crisis first appeared in the form of a sharp decline in fertility rates during the late 1990s, much below the level necessary to assure a simple replacement of generations. Since the EU accession, the mass labor migration from the east to the west added yet another dimension to this growing problem. This paper attempts to explain the variation in governmental social policy responses, primarily in the family policy sphere, between the two countries. Hungary, due to its long-term tradition of relatively generous and extensive social programs directed to the families, the youth, and children would be expected to handle this perceived emergency much better than Poland. Yet, the opposite has happened. In the last few years, Poland has proposed and implemented a host of innovative measures to address the low fertility and migration pressures while Hungary has opted only for token changes in its existing policies. I will attempt to explain the variation in policy development by focusing on a combination of a historical-insititutionalist explanation, i.e. the legacy of demographic emergency defined as national survival or/and a social policy problem, and a political explanation, focusing on the emergence of contemporary coalitions of governmental and non-governmental actors who either facilitate or obstruct effective policy innovation. This paper will be based on the most recent empirical research conducted in the two countries.
