A Systemic Politicization of the European Commission in European Economic Governance

The economic reforms introduced since 2011 have changed the face of European economic governance, introducing stronger economic coordination, surveillance and reporting. They have involved significant ‘delegation [of powers] to non-majoritarian, technocratic supranational organizations’ (Schimmelfennig, 2014, p. 334), such as the Commission, by Member States (MS) in search of policy credibility, which should indicate a de-politicization of decision-making in European economic matters.

However, there is theoretical debate regarding this process of de-politicization. When it comes to the Commission itself, politicization is used as a concept to understand politico-administrative structures, relationships and rules internal to the Commission, involving its human resources, their selection, recruitment, promotion and the executive relationships that ensue. The analysis of this puzzle of politicization of the Commission when elite resistance to this process is at its highest requires a broader framework involving internal and external mediating factors.

On the basis of the De Wilde and Zürn’s model of politicization (2012), this article argues that the increase in the Commission’s authority in economic matters between 2011 and 2016 has triggered its politicization. However, this process can only be explained by using a chain of mediating causal factors moving from endogenous dynamics to the Commission to endogenous pressures on the institution. This places the institution in the most politicized position vis a vis the MS and their public opinions that it has ever known. It also disproves new intergovernmentalism’s hypothesis that relegates the institution to technocratic grounds where ‘it gets on with its work’ (Peterson, 2015, p. 207).