Investor Protection As a Threat to Democracy: The Potency and Limits of a Frame

A concerted campaign by civil society organisations (CSOs) turned a relatively obscure area of international economic law, investment protection, and particularly investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), into the lightning rod for much of the opposition to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In response, the European Commission revised its approach to negotiating investor protection in the agreement. This article analyzes how civil society mobilization shaped the EU’s position, and the limits of its influence. Drawing on recent scholarship marrying insights from constructivist International Political Economy and social psychology, it argues that the power of CSOs resided in their ability to strategically reframe the usually highly technical domain of investment treaty arbitration as a threat to democracy and the rule of law. This aroused strong emotions and was sufficiently broadly framed so as to have wide appeal. The breadth of the frame, however, was also its Achilles Heel, as it provided space for the Commission to undertake a series of reforms that could also be legitimated in terms of their democratic credentials. Thus, while the reforms have failed to satisfy most opponents, the Commission’s counter-framing of TTIP as an opportunity to move ISDS towards a system of ‘public law’ has placated some pivotal actors (most notably Social Democrats in the European Parliament and Member States). The article exploits the variation in the frame’s resonance across actors to identify potential constraints faced by opponents of deep integration.