Ethnic Minority Political Parties and Voter Accountability

This paper explores whether ethnic minority political parties in post-communist Europe are less vulnerable to electoral punishment for government performance than parties that appeal to voters from the ethnic majority. I look at how ethnic minority parties that have agreed to serve in a broad governing coalition fare in subsequent national elections as compared to other coalition members. While there is evidence in the literature that parties in post-communist democracies are rewarded or punished based on their performance in government, there is reason to believe that voters for ethnic minority parties are more consistent in their support for them. After all, ethnic minority parties are, at least in theory, different from other parties for several reasons, including a relatively stable electorate and weakly held substantive policy positions. I hypothesize that due to these differences, incumbent ethnic minority parties are less likely to be electorally punished than their mainstream counterparts. I test this argument using a quantitative analysis of election data from a set of East-Central European countries where electorally viable political parties represent in parliament particular ethnic minority groups.