Thursday, July 13, 2017
JWS - Room J10 (J355) (University of Glasgow)
The crisis-induced strengthening of the system of European economic governance aimed to reduce the cross-border risks stemming from ongoing economic and fiscal policy integration. These changes should ensure the sustainability and health of the European economy and the fiscal positions of its member states. Simultaneously, the legitimacy of the new system is challenged by the increasing politicization and political contestation of the EU and its system of economic governance. This creates institutional risks for the actors involved in the implementation and enforcement of this system. The paper asks whether and to what extent these actors, most notably the European Commission and the Council, adhere to their own rules or are responsive to political pressures emanating from domestic political arenas. We employ a signaling approach to examine Commission and Council responsiveness to signaled political opposition to EU intervention by domestic publics, political parties, parliaments and member state governments. The paper is based an original large-N dataset covering decision-making on multiple European economic and fiscal surveillance tools for all EU member states for the period of 1999-2016.