The IMF As a Learning Agent: The Role of Accountability Processes in IMF Policy Formation

Accountability, understood as a process of learning and reform, can lead to the identification of sources of institutional pathologies and offer opportunities for governments and organisations to reform their structures and policies to avoid future crises.  In theory, this should hold true for international finance institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF, and these organisations are subject to a host of political and institutional mechanisms of accountability.  Nonetheless, these institutions regularly face criticism for their lack of transparency and accountability (Woods 2001; 2003; Stiglitz 2003).  This is in part because IFIs sit tenuously in an unbalanced set of accountability relationships: they are fiscally responsible to member states, but not democratically accountable to the countries whose policies they influence.  The norms and standards to which the IMF is held to account thus reflect the interests of its most powerful stakeholders (member states).

However, the IMF has shown signs of learning from its mistakes. Challenging its long-held commitment to a neoliberal agenda, IMF economists recently reported on the limits of neoliberal policies (IMF, June 2016), highlighting the role of such policies to generate inequality.  Have accountability processes contributed to this policy adjustment? Do internal monitory bodies such as the IMF’s independent evaluation office (IEO) serve as sources of learning?  In short, what pedagogical roles do internal and external processes of accountability play in the IMF’s policy (re)-formation? This exploratory paper will approach the IMF’s policy formation as an instance of organisational learning resulting from accountability processes.