Scholars in political economy have extensively analyzed how states constrain or facilitate financial markets through legislation. This work stresses the dependence of states on finance – either as a result of the structural position of finance or lobbying activities. However, (quasi-)public authorities or agencies themselves have become active market players. Financial professionals, practices, and frames permeate the state. Little attention has been directed towards the changing preferences and strategies of public actors in their dual role as facilitators of financial markets and financial market participants: Are public actors the makers or takers of financial market expansion? How has the expansion of finance shaped the preferences of firms and public officials? Which approaches are able to grasp the changing relationship between finance and the state? This panel brings together empirical research on contemporary facets of financialization with an emphasis on the manifold relationships between financialization, firms, and the state. Raphael Reinke focuses on firms and how policies affect their reactions in the context of financialization. Natascha van der Zwan interrogates the financialization of pension systems in the US and the Netherlands and its ramifications for public finance. Benjamin Braun and Daniela Gabor scrutinize central banks as market makers by analyzing the global diffusion of marketization of central bank agency and its role in the proliferation of repo markets. Finally, Florian Fastenrath, Agnes Orban, and Christine Trampusch examine when expectations regarding financial innovations change in times of crises by focusing on swap losses experienced by local treasurers in Germany and the US.