Decentralization as a National-Level Electoral Strategy in Western Europe

Why do national governments voluntarily give away significant political and/or fiscal powers to subnational authorities?  Contributing to the literature on the origins of institutions, this paper views decentralization as an electoral strategy in party competition.  Specifically, I argue that decentralization is a means to bolster a governing party’s national-level electoral strength.  It is a tool, akin to policy appeasement, used to co-opt the pro-decentralization voters of threatening regionalist parties in national elections.  This perspective on decentralization allows us to understand why parties create and strengthen subnational governments that they do not always expect to control.  I assess this explanation of decentralization using a large-N analysis of regional-level election data from 17 Western European countries from 1970 to 2006.  Preliminary results support the conclusion that governing parties use decentralization as a means to undermine regionalist party threat and shore up their own national-level electoral support.