Who Framed the F-35? the Role of Political Communication in Defence Procurement

Defence policy involves a great deal of political communication.  The state’s threat and opportunity environment, the operational commitments of its military, or its budgetary situations have no meaning outside language or, more theoretically put, outside national narratives, discourses of identity, representational practices, or rhetorical reasoning.  Arguing for spending cuts, celebrating an alliance, debating the new procurement, haranguing the chief of staff, reassuring defence industry officials, worrying about the readiness of armed forces – all of these acts of communication are pervasive in any defence policy process. Indeed, any public policy is essentially communicative in the sense that it has to be articulated in front of audiences on a regular basis.  Involved in this process are multiple forms of power, including the so-called productive power.  By considering the ongoing fighter jet acquisition processes in Norway and the UK, both of which involved Lockheed Martin's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, this paper examines the power of political communication in defence policy.  Debates about what weapons best fit national defence needs, I argue, are not so much about the clash of expert and rational-legal authority as they are about defining what kinds of nations Norway and the UK wish to be. This argument is developed through a close reading of a large number of documents, including those made available by WikiLeaks, as well as a smaller number of interviews with defence officials. Implicated in this analysis are broader issues of transatlantic relations, European integration, and defence lobbying, all of which are of considerable policy relevance.