Games of Compliance: The Commission, the European Court of Justice, and Enforcement of EU Law

The infringement procedures (IPs) are the main tool at the disposal of the EU to enforce compliance with its rules at the national level. The functioning of these procedures over the last years has generated a number of puzzling developments. The overall number of IP is relatively low and is on the decline. The vast majority of the IPs never reaches the ECJ but is settled during the management part of the process during which the Commission enjoys considerable discretion to drop or pursue cases. Even more interestingly, the ECJ decides in favor of the Commission in nearly 90% of the cases. This paper models the IPs with the help of game theory with the aim to explain these empirical puzzles. The presented models are based on the strategic interactions between the member states, the Commission and the ECJ, and provide testable hypotheses about the patterns of compliance in the EU.