Discounting Europe? EU Security and Defence Policy between financial, political and constitutional constraints

The starting point of this paper is the permeation of the discourse on EU security and defence policy by the financial crisis. Calls for a more assertive Europe, also in the area of security policy, have long been uttered. To politicians and the public, this seemed as the perfect area for the Union to add value. The implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) during the past ten years has heeded these calls to some extent.  At crucial moments though, the Union has failed to act, such as most recently in the Libyan civil war. Le Monde declared it to be ‘dead’ in the sands of Libya, while Britain and France have engaged in bilateral cooperation arrangements in the area of defence (the so-called ‘entente frugale’). The CSDP is thus at a crucial juncture. Either it is not ‘worth it’ anymore, the Member States simply cannot afford it in the face of financial crisis, or it serves as a catalyst for the Member States to economise and improve its clout at the same time, turning crisis into opportunity. However, tackling the financial challenge raises numerous legal and institutional issues given its ‘sovereignty sensitive’ nature and the intergovernmental design of the CSDP. The present paper maps out these issues and proposes ways to resolve them.