Crisis and Collective Action: Agendas, Alternatives, and Programmatic Elites in European Union Public Health Policies

Tuesday, June 25, 2013
A1.18D (Oudemanhuispoort)
Scott L. Greer , School of Public Health, University of Michigan School of Public Health
Without understanding the politics of bureaucratic entrepreneurialism, it would be impossible to explain our chosen case: public health policy in the European Union. Public health is not something we naturally expect the European Union to do. Many EU states have little tradition of public health initiatives and historically would regard them as meddling; the EU itself has weak legal powers, a short history and little public profile on the topic; and if states brook any interventions into their peoples’ eating, drinking, and sex, they tend to regard themselves as the most qualified to make them. But public health policy is a largely unspoken success of European integration. The EU has not only gained broader legal competencies with each treaty revision since 1992; it has also created a range of public health initiatives as diverse as blood regulation, infectious disease reporting systems, and public-private alcohol initiatives. Why has this happened?

This paper answers the question by identifying the roles of “programmatic elites”: networks of policymakers, based in member state governments and agencies, who can make beneficial alliances with entrepreneurial parts of the EU. Our approach is to compare policy areas where EU institutions’ initiatives had different degrees of success at constructing a competency and a policy. It compares three European Union health policy initiatives: communicable disease control, where the EU is constructing a supranational agency and continent-wide networks; the Platform on Diet, Nutrition, and Physical Activity, which attempts to reduce obesity; and Health in All Policies, an effort specified in the EU treaties to promote health through “non-health” policies such as agricultural or foreign aid policy.

The reason lies in the extent to which the EU institutions can mobilize and strengthen programmatic elites such as those responsible for disease control. Where there are existing weak networks, EU funding and intervention can strengthen them with resources, connections, and policy arguments. Where there are powerful existing interests, such as other established policy fields, any benefits from participation in EU public health networks are counteracted by existing bureaucratic structures.