Wednesday, June 26, 2013
2.04 (Binnengasthuis)
This paper analyses the preference-formation of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom towards EUFOR Althea’s deployment in December 2004. This represents a puzzle because, although all of them supported the operation when the EU first proposed it, they disagreed about it a few months later and then supported it again. By using collective action theory, the paper argues that the three countries ultimately agreed on EUFOR’s deployment because they saw it as a lucrative joint product activity, i.e. a collective action producing both public and private goods. Firstly, EUFOR was expected to produce a relatively pure public good by continuing to stabilise Bosnia. Although the country’s security climate had improved, the EU recognised the need to maintain a military presence there as a deterrent against nationalistic movements and organised crime. Secondly, it produced private goods by allowing all three countries to reduce their military presence in Bosnia from the levels they had maintained during NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which saved them national resources. Thirdly, EUFOR contributed to the production of a European club good by making the structures of the EU’s nascent Common Security and Defence Policy more robust. However, whereas France and Germany preferred CSDP to become relatively autonomous from NATO, Britain wanted it to be closely linked to the Alliance. These clashing preferences on the nature of this club good explain the differences that emerged between the countries soon after they first supported SFOR’s handover to the EU.
