Scholars have however emphasized how the regulation of the parties’ funding regimes has been one of the means through which the established political elites keep new or potential party formations out from power resources, while granting themselves greater opportunities for organizational survivor. In this light, rather than constituting a tool for enhancing democratic processes, public funding would constitute a tool for disadvantaging the challengers and self-perpetuating the political status quo.
Drawing on longitudinal data gathered on both Western and Eastern European countries,[1]in this paper we test this argument focusing on the actual rules that have been established: what are the thresholds for accessing public funding? are subsidies disbursed to both parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties? what is the timing for the reimbursement of election campaign expenditures? and, finally, does public funding to political parties favor democratic processes or does it further deepen the legitimacy crisis of political institutions?
[1] Data collected within the framework of the ERC project ‘Re-conceptualizing Party Democracy’ (see www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl).
