Deepening globalization and Europeanization have reduced government resources available for partisan use. Devolution and political reforms, introduced to make governments more accountable to citizens, have further limited discretion of central governments. In addition, gradual erosion of ties between established parties and their traditional constituencies has brought intense competition in the party systems. These developments are expected to terminate clientelist practices. However, both in countries known for the prevalence of clientelism, such as Italy, Japan and Korea, and in those without strong tradition of such practices, such as France and Australia, there are persistence, and in some cases resurgence, of clientelist exchanges.
To better understand this paradox, the authors examine the supply-side of clientelism – changing incentives for patrons (party politicians) in mobilizing support. Based on the insights of new institutionalism and detailed case studies, the paper finds the following. Societal and political changes in the last two decades resulted in highly unpredictable edge-to-edge competition among political parties. This uncertainty gives them incentives to resort to clientelistic strategies to address collective action problems. While the potential for mobilization of such strategies is remarkably limited today in comparison to programmatic and populist strategies, the credibility of support under clientelist relationship still attracts political parties.
